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COMMENT
CODE PLEADING-REAL

PARTY

IN

INTEREST-RIGHT

OF

SUBROGEE - INSURER TO SUE IN ITS OWN NAME.

APPLICATION of the real party in interest statute' to a
suit against a tort-feasor after the insurance company has
been subrogated to the rights of the aggrieved party2 has led to
a variety of results in the courts. The cases divide themselves
into two categories: (1) where the insurer has paid the full
loss or more, and (2) where the insurer has paid part of the
loss.

THE

WHERE THE INSURER PAYS THE ENTIRE Loss OR MORE

There is authority for the rule that the insurer must sue
in its own name when the insured has been fully compensated
through
insurance.3 In the case of Cox v. Cincinnati Traction
4
Co. the defendant interposed a defense to an action by the

insured to the effect that the insurer had been subrogated to
the claims of the plaintiff-insured by payment to the insured
of the entire loss, and that the insurer was the real party in interest who should bring the suit. In sustaining the argument
of* the defendant the court commented upon the statute in
the following manner: "It is not directory, but mandatory.
Its purpose was to bring the actual claimant for relief before
the court, and was a proper and necessary part of the reformed procedure which sought to abolish the fictions obtaining under the old practice." 5 One of those fictions was the use
of the name of the subrogor or assignor as nominal plaintiff
in such a suit. This requirement was formal only because the
insured had no substantive right of action and hence the
change wrought by the codes did not affect any of the substanI N.D. Rev. Code 028-0201 (1943). "Every, action shall be prosecuted in the
name of the real party in interest, but an executor, administrator, guardian,
trustee of an express trust, a party with whom or in whose name a contract has
been made for the benefit of another, or a party authorized by statute, may sue
in his own name without joining with him the party for whose benefit the
action is brought; and when a statute so provides, an action for the use or
benefit of another may be brought in the name of the state of North Dakota."
2 But cf. Weber v. United Hardware & Implement Mutuals Co., 75 N.D. 581,
31 N.W. 2d 456 (1948).
3 Waters v. Schultz, 233 Mich. 143, 206 N.W. 548 (1925);
Cunningham v.
Seaboard Air Line Ry., 139 N.C. 427, 51 S.E. 1029 (1905); Allen v. Chicago &
N.W. Ry., 94 Wis. 93, 68 N.W. 873 (1896); cf. Lord & Taylor, Inc. v. Yale &
Towne Manufacturing Co., 230 N.Y. 132, 129 N.E. 346 (1920).
4 45 Ohio C.C. 824 (1923).
3 Id. at 828.
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tive rights of the parties involved.6 The courts which hold
that a defendant cannot raise the objection that the suit is
not brought by the real party in interest when the insured
is bringing suit place much emphasis upon the reasoning that
the wrongdoer has no right to the benefits of the insurance7
but these courts fail to realize that the code framers intended
to adopt the equitable rules as to parties8 and that the insured
had no right of action in equity before the introduction of
the codes. 9 The Supreme Court of the United States in United
States v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.'0 said, "If the subrogee
has paid an entire loss suffered by the insured, it is the only
real party in interest and must sue in its own name.""
Some courts hold that the insurer may sue in its own name
as contrasted with the rule that the insurer must sue in its
own name.1 2- In City of New York Insurance Co. v. Tice 13 the
Kansas Supreme Court was confronted with the peculiar situation of the insurer suing alone after the insured had been
fully compensated for his loss by a partial payment by the
insurer and the remaining amount by the wrongdoer to whom
the insured had executed a release from all liability. The court
held that the insurer could maintain the action in its own name
even though it did not pay the full loss to the insured because,
"The essential fact is that the insured no longer has a financial
interest in the outcome.' 1 4 The court argued that there was
no splitting of a cause of action here because the insured
brought no action and if it were conceded that it was a splitting, the wrongdoer had waived his objection by taking a release while he had full knowledge of the rights of the insurer. 15
Generally where the court holds that the insurer may sue
alone, the insurer is already a party to the action and the de6 Clark and Hutchins, The Real Party in Interest, 34 Yale L.J. 259 (1925).
7 Illinois Central Ry. v. Hicklin, 131 Ky. 624, 115 S.W. 752 (1909); accord
Humev. McGinnis, 156 Kan. 300, 133 P.2d 162 (1943).
8 Se.Bonee v. Stern, 73 N.D. 273, 283, 14 N.W. 2d 249, 253 (1944).
9 Cla fk and Hutchins, op. cit. supra note 6, at 271.
l0 70 S. Ct. 207 (1949).
11 Id. at 215. Fed. R. Civ. P. 17 (a) on real party In interest is almost identical
with N.D. Rev. Code §28-0201 (1943).
12 Travelers Insurance Co. v. Great Lakes Eng. Works Co., 184 Fed. 426, (6th
Cir. 1911); accord Harrington v. Central States Fire Ins. Co., 169 Okla. 255, 36
P. 2d 738 (1934).
13 159 Kan. 176, 152 P.2d 836 (1944).
14 159 Kan. 176, 162 P.2d 836 at 840.
15 Other jurisdictions support this view. Atchison T. & S. F. Ry. v. Home Ins.
Co., 59 Kan. 432, 53 Pac. 459 (1898); Conn. Fire Ins. Co. v. Erie Ry., 73 N.Y.
399 (1878). Contra: Casualty Reciprocal Exch. v. Kansas City Public Service
Co., 230 Mo. App. 468, 91 S.W. 2d 227 (1936).
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fendant is contesting his right to bring the action; wil , .s
if the court holds that the insurer must sue alone, the insurer
is not a party to the action but the defendant is attempting
to bring it in as a real party in interest. 16 It is a logical conclusion, therefore, that a holding that the insurer may bring
the action in its own name does not preclude a later holding
by the same court that it must sue in its own name.
WHERE THE INSURFR PAYS PART OF THE

Loss

Courts agree that in this circumstance the insurer cannot
sue alone ;17 but there is ample authority supporting the right
of the insured to sue alone.ls The Oklahoma Supreme Court in
Harringtonv. Central States Fire Insurance Co. 10 said, "The
reason for the rule is that the wrongful act is single and indivisible, and gives rise to but one liability. If it were otherwise, if one insurer may sue, then if there were a number
each could do likewise, and if the aggregate of all policies falls
short of the actual loss the assured owner could sue for the
balance, and the alleged wrongdoer would be compelled to defend a multitude of suits." 20
Many courts hold that the insurer and the insured may join
in an action against the tort-feasor when the insurer has paid
part of the loss. 2 1 This result is justified by virtue of the permissive joinder of parties statute.2 2 The Supreme Court of
California in Fairbanks v. San Francisco & N. P. Ry. 23 held
that the insurer and the insured may join because the negligent
act which gave rise to the suit in that case was the single
cause of the damage and if all of the damages could not be recovered in the same action, the defendant might be sued twice
for the single wrongful act.
1s Compare Cox v. Cincinnati Traction Co., 45 Ohio C.C. 824 (1923),
with
Travelers Insurance Co. v. Great Lakes Eng. Works Co., 184 Fed. 426 (6th Cir.
1911).
17 Aetna Ins. Co. v. Hannibal & St. J. Ry., 1 Fed. Cas. 207, No. 96 (E.D. Mo.
1874); Continental Ins. Co. v. H. M. Loud & Sons Lumber Co., 93 Mich. 139, 53
N.W. 394 (1892).
18 Flor v. Buck, 189 Minn. 131, 248 N.W. 271 (1933); Solberg v. Mpls. WillysKnight Co., 177 Minn. 10, 224 N.W. 271 (1929); accord, Shiman Bros. & Co. v.
Nebraska Nat. Hotel Co., 143 Neb. 404, 9 N.W. 2d 807 (1943).
19 169 Okla. 255, 36 P.2d 738 (1934).
20 169 Okla. 255, 36 P.2d 738, at 740.
21 Home Ins. Co. v. Lack, 196 Ark. 878, 120 S.W. 2d 355 (1938); B. & 0 Ry. v.
Day, 91 Ind.App. 347 , 166 N.E. 668 (1929); De Carli v. O'Brien, 150 Ore. 35,
41 P. 2d 411 (1935).
22 N.D. Rev. Code §28-0205 (1943).
23 115 Cal. 579, 47 Pac. 450 (1897).
Nor did the fact that the insured claimed
an additional element in damages in the nature of lost business profits prevent
joinder in this case.
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The compulsory joinder of parties statute24 has been invoked. by numerous authorities to sustain the proposition that
the insurer and the insured must join when the insurer has
paid part of the loss. 2 1 Both parties have substantive rights
in the claim and the defendant is entitled to have the insurer,
who claims against him, set forth his claims because the
defendant may have defenses against one party which he
does not have against the other. 26 In Pratt v. Radford27 the
Supreme Court of Wisconsin held that the insurer and the
insured were united in interest and that since the statute'"
was imperative, the insurance company and the injured party
must be parties to the action. This court pointed out that in
Wisconsin if the wrongdoer paid the insured knowing that
the latter had received part payment of the loss from the
insurer, the defendant would still be liable to the insurance
company. The U. S. Supreme Court has held that in the instance of partial payment by the insurer, the latter and the
insured are necessary parties, but not indispensable parties. ' 0
This means that the defendants may compel their joinder
but it is not essential to a final decree that they join.2 0 A comparison of the cases holding that the insurer and the insured
must join with those holding that they may join reveals that
the same court may consistently decide cases in both groups
because if it is conceded that insurer and insured must join,
they certainly may join.sl
In recent years the insurance companies have developed a
method under which they have generally succeeded in keeping their names out of suits against tort-feasors even though
the insured persons have been paid in full or in part. By the use
of what is termed a loan receipt, the insurers have turned over
the amount of the insurance under an agreement with the
24 N.D. Rev. Code §28-0208 (1943).
25 Sisson r. Hassett, 155 Misc. 667, 280

N.Y.Supp. 148 (1935); Simpson v.
Hartranft, 157 Misc. 387, 283 N.Y.Supp. 754 (1935); cf. Northwest Door Co. v.
Lewis Investment Co., 92 Ore. 186, 180 Pac. 495 (1919).
2r Verdier v. Marshallville Equity Co., 70 Ohio App. 434, 46 N.E.2d 636 (1940).
27 52 Wis. 114, 8 N.W. 606 (1881).
2,8See note 24 supra.
"0 United States v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Co., 70 S.Ct.217 (1949).
30 Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(b). See Shields v. Barrow, 17 How. 130 (U.S. 1854), for
the indispensable party test.
31 Compare De Carli v. O'Brien, 150 Ore. 35, 41 P.2d 411 (1935), with Home
Mutual Ins. Co. v. Ore. Ry. & Navigation Co., 20 Ore. 569, 26 Pac. 857 (1891);
see Gaugler v. Chicago, M. & P. Ry., 197 Fed. 79 (D. Mont. 1912), where the
court decided not only that the insurer and the insured may join, but that they
were compelled to do so.
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insured in which he promises to repay the loan only in the
event that the suit against the wrongdoers is unproductive.
The validity of the loan receipt has been sustained by the
United States Supreme Court in the case of Luchenback 3v.
2
32
McCahan Sugar Refining Co., and by many other courts.
The effect of a holding that the loan receipt is valid is that
there has been no payment and the insured is the only real
party in interest.3 4 Courts which find the loan receipt invalid
hold that what the insurer has termed a loan is really a payment and the rules of that jurisdiction in regard to who should
bring the action against the tort-feasor apply as in the ordinary case of partial or full payment of the loss. 3 Insurance
companies that use the loan receipt transaction do so with
the purpose in mind of keeping their names out of suits upon
the well-known grounds that juries have an innate prejudice
against insurers. 36 Some authorities have stated that the insurer's fear of an unfair trial is a problem for the legislature,
but of course if loan receipts are upheld as valid the insurer
2
achieves his objective without the aid of the legislature. 3
The presence of a provision in an insurance contract giving
the insurer the right to recover damages from the wrongdoer,
or an assignment by the insured after payment by the insurer
does not exclude subrogation of the insurer to the rights of
the insured.3 8 In Offer v. Superior Court of City and County of
San Franciscos the Supreme Court of California states the
relationship between subrogation and assignment in the following manner: "The better view is that a court of law may
deal with subrogation as it may with assignment, and when
the right of action to which a plaintiff asks to be subrogated
is a legal right of action a court of law may treat a plaintiff
who is entitled in equity to subrogation as an assignee, and
allow him to maintain an action of a legal nature upon the
32 248 U.S. 139 (1918).
33 Shiman Bros. & Co. v. Nebraska Nat. Hotel Co., 143 Neb: 404, 9 N.W.2d 807
(1943); Merrimack Mfg. Co. v. Lowell Trucking Corp., 181 Misc. 372, 46 N.Y.S.2d
736 (1944); Phillips v. Clifton Mfg. Co., 204 S.C. 496, 30 S.E.2d 146 (1944).
34 Shiman Bros. & Co. v. Nebraska Nat. Hotel Co., 143 Neb. 404, 9 N.W.2d 807
(1943); Phillips v. Clifton Mfg. Co., 204 S.C. 496, 30 S.E.2d 146 (1944).
.. 35 Purdy v. McGarity, 262 App. Div. 623, 30 N.Y.S.2d 966 (1941); Scarborough
v. Bartholomew, 22 N.Y.S.2d 635 (1940).
36Merrimack Mfg. Co. v. Lowell Trucking Corp., 181 Misc. 372, 46 N.Y.S.2d
736 (1944).
37 Purdy v. McGarity, 262 App. Div. 623, 30 N.Y.S.2d 966 (1941).
38 Note, 10 Ind. L.J. 528 (1935).
30 194 Cal. 114, 228 Pac. 11 (1924).
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right to which he claims to be subrogated. ' 140 In other words
the same legal principles in regard to who should sue the
evildoer after the insurer has paid a part or the whole of the
loss to the insured apply whether there was an express assignment or not.41
North Dakota has not decided the problems presented in
this comment. There are only a few general statements by the
court of this state concerning the real party in interest statute which indicate to a slight degree what the thoughts of
the court are upon the subject. 42 A ruling that the insurer
must sue in its own name upon payment of the entire loss
appears to conform with the equitable precedents which the
code framers intended to apply to suits at law; and a ruling
that the insurer and the insured must join upon partial payment of the loss would seem to follow logically. Compulsory
joinder of the insurer and the insured where part of the loss
is covered by insurance eliminates any argument which
charges the plaintiffs with splitting a cause of action and
subjecting the defendant to several suits on the same breach
of duty. On the other hand a ruling upholding the validity of
the loan receipt transaction would afford the insurer ample
protection where the insurer utilizes such a device to avoid
any chance of jury prejudice against insurers.
JACK TRAYNOR

Second Year Law Student.

40 194 Cal. 114, 228 Pac. 11, 13 (1924).
41 See note 38 supra.
42 See Bonde v. Stern, 73 N.D. 273,283, 14 N.W.2d 249, 253 (1944), where the
court in commenting generally upon the codes said, " ... the provisions of the
Code of Civil Procedure, with which we are here concerned, are enactments of
rules of equity pleading and are applicable in all actions whether at law or in
equity. And when a question arises as to their use, construction or application,
equitable precedents may be looked to for guidance." In American Soda Fountain
Co. v. Hogue, the court spoke concerning the real party in interest statute in
the following manner: "The object of the statute is to give the beneficial. owners
the right to sue in their own right without regard to the technical title as
shown by the contract." 17 N.D. 375, 377, 116 N.W. 339, 340 (1908).

